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ABSTRACT
In the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and many
other nations, those involved in law and policy have been exploring
initiatives that preserve freedom of choice, or “nudges,” informed by
behavioral science and promoting important public policy goals, such
as improved health and safety. But there is a large and insufficiently
explored difference between System 1 nudges, which target or benefit
from automatic processing, and System 2 nudges, which target or
benefit from deliberative processing. Graphic warnings and default
rules are System 1 nudges; statistical information and factual
disclosures are System 2 nudges. On philosophical grounds, it might
seem tempting to prefer System 2 nudges, on the assumption that they
show greater respect for individual dignity and promote individual
agency. A nationally representative survey in the United States finds
evidence that, in important contexts, most people do prefer System 2
nudges. At the same time, that preference is not fixed and firm. If people
are asked to assume that the System 1 nudge is significantly more
effective, then many of them will shift to preferring the System 1 nudge.
In a range of contexts, Republicans, Democrats, and independents
show surprisingly similar responses. The survey findings and an
accompanying normative analysis offer lessons for those involved in
law and policy who are choosing between System 1 nudges and System
2 nudges.
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INTRODUCTION
In numerous nations, those involved in law and policy have been
exploring policy initiatives that preserve freedom of choice, or
“nudges,” informed by behavioral economics and psychology and
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meant to promote important goals, such as improved health and
safety.1 But there is a large and insufficiently explored difference
between System 1 nudges, which are not educative and which target or
benefit from automatic processing, and System 2 nudges, which are
educative and target or benefit from deliberative processing. Graphic
warnings and default rules count as System 1 nudges; statistical
information and factual disclosures count as System 2 nudges.
On philosophical grounds, it is tempting to prefer System 2
nudges, on the assumption that they show greater respect for individual
autonomy and dignity and promote individual agency. But it is also
possible to prefer System 1 nudges, on the ground that they are likely
to be cheaper and more effective, and also because they promote
autonomy in their own way, by allowing people to conserve scarce
cognitive resources and to devote attention to their largest concerns.
For example, automatic enrollment in sensible savings plans might be
preferable to financial education—or vice versa. Any judgment
between System 1 and System 2 nudges would seem to require
judgments about social welfare and individual autonomy, and the
extent to which one or another nudge will promote them.
A nationally representative survey in the United States finds
evidence that, in important contexts in law and policy, a majority does
prefer System 2 nudges. At the same time, that preference is not fixed
and firm. If people are asked to assume that the System 1 nudge is
significantly more effective, then many of them will shift to preferring
the System 1 nudge. In a range of contexts, Republicans, Democrats,
and independents show surprisingly similar responses.
The survey findings fit with an analysis of a basic principle, which
suggests that on grounds of welfare and autonomy, the choice between
the two kinds of nudges is not self-evident. A great deal depends on
context. In some settings, a System 1 nudge will promote social welfare
and will not compromise autonomy in any way, and in some settings, a
System 2 nudge is better on welfare grounds and will best promote
autonomy. The survey findings, and the analysis, offer concrete lessons
for those involved in law and policy who are choosing between System
1 nudges and System 2 nudges.
1. See generally DAVID HALPERN, INSIDE THE NUDGE UNIT (2015) (recounting the efforts
of the United Kingdom’s Behavioural Insights Team, nicknamed the “Nudge Unit”); RHYS
JONES, JESSICA PYKETT & MARK WHITEHEAD, CHANGING BEHAVIOURS: ON THE RISE OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE (2013) (analyzing the emergence of this trend); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
SIMPLER (2013) (discussing this approach in the context of its application by the Obama
Administration).

SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

9/21/2016 3:18 PM

124

[Vol. 66:121

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

I. SYSTEM 1 NUDGES AND SYSTEM 2 NUDGES
Nudges are interventions that steer people in particular directions
but also allow them to go their own way.2 A reminder is a nudge; so is
a warning. A GPS device nudges; a default rule nudges. Disclosure of
relevant information (for example, about the risks of smoking or the
costs of borrowing) counts as a nudge. A recommendation is a nudge.
“Save More Tomorrow” plans, which allow employees to sign up to
give some portion of their future earnings to pension programs, are
nudges.3 The same is true of “Give More Tomorrow” plans, which
allow employees to decide to give some portion of their future earnings
to charity.4
In many domains of law and policy, nudges are easy to find,
whether or not they go by that name.5 In an increasing number of
nations, including the United States and the United Kingdom,
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology are being used to
reorient law and policy in numerous areas, including savings, organ
donation, energy, the environment, smoking, poverty, crime, voting
behavior, and health.6
In terms of law and public policy, it is helpful to distinguish
between educative and noneducative nudges. Educative nudges
include disclosure requirements, reminders, and warnings, which are
specifically designed to increase people’s own powers of agency—

2. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008) (defining and exploring choice-preserving
approaches).
3. See RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
309–22 (2015).
4. See generally Anna Breman, Give More Tomorrow: Two Field Experiments on Altruism
and Intertemporal Choice, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1349 (2011) (showing significant increases in giving
when Give More Tomorrow programs are implemented).
5. The most important examples are default rules, on which the literature is voluminous.
For a classic discussion, see generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (analyzing how
decisionmakers should set default rules). On nudging that is harmful, see generally GEORGE A.
AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION
AND DECEPTION (2015) (exploring how markets reward certain kinds of manipulation); OREN
BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT (2012) (exploring how markets reward companies that
exploit behavioral biases).
6. See supra note 1. For an important executive order on the uses of behavioral science, see
Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People, 80 Fed. Reg. 56,365
(Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-09-18/pdf/2015-23630.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BEK3-P9L8] (directing agencies to use behavioral science in engaging with the
American people).
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perhaps by augmenting their knowledge and their capacities, perhaps
by making relevant facts salient. Educative nudges can promote
welfare by enabling people to make choices that increase their wellbeing. In addition, educative nudges can easily fit within those aspects
of the liberal political tradition that emphasize agency and autonomy.7
By adding to people’s stock of knowledge, they can help them to be
better choosers.
Noneducative nudges include default rules and strategic decisions
about how items are ordered (as on a menu or at a cafeteria); these are
designed to preserve freedom of choice without necessarily increasing
individual agency. Noneducative nudges may well increase welfare in
the same way that GPS devices do (because they make it so much
easier to navigate); such nudges might also be welcome because they
impose few demands, in terms of time or attention, on those whom they
are aimed to benefit. In that respect, noneducative nudges might
promote autonomy in addition to welfare.
Within behavioral science, some people have found it helpful to
distinguish between two families of cognitive operations in the human
mind: System 1, which is fast, automatic, and intuitive, and System 2,
which is slow, calculative, and deliberative.8 When people recognize a
smiling face, add three plus three, or know how to get to their
bathroom in the middle of the night, System 1 is at work. When people
first learn to drive, when they multiply 563 times 322, or when they
choose a medical plan among several hard-to-distinguish alternatives,
they must rely on System 2.
System 1 can and often does get things right.9 As Daniel
Kahneman and Shane Frederick write, “Although System 1 is more

7. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (describing a liberal
conception of freedom and autonomy).
8. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (describing and
analyzing this distinction and its impact). The idea of two systems is controversial, and it is
reasonable to ask what, exactly, the idea is meant to capture. For example, something very
different from a two-systems account is offered in Elizabeth A. Phelps, Karolina M. Lempert &
Peter Sokol-Hessner, Emotion and Decision Making: Multiple Modulatory Neural Circuits, 37
ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 263, 281–82 (2014) (suggesting that multiple, not dual, systems
underlie decisionmaking). Following Kahneman, I understand the idea as a useful fiction, not
referring to “systems in the standard sense of entities with interacting aspects or parts.”
KAHNEMAN, supra, at 29. For those who reject the terminology, or are skeptical of it, it might be
helpful simply to distinguish between noneducative and educative nudges, and to see the surveys
here as asking when people prefer one or the other.
9. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Gary Klein, Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A
Failure to Disagree, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 515 (2009) (showing that those with apparently
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primitive than System 2, it is not necessarily less capable.”10 Through
fast and frugal heuristics, people can perform exceedingly well.11 Any
professional athlete or musician has an educated System 1; Serena
Williams knows what shot to hit in an instant, and Taylor Swift has no
difficulty remembering how to play her songs. As a result of years of
practice, an experienced lawyer, judge, doctor, or engineer has a welltrained System 1, and trained intuitions are often on the mark.12 At the
same time, System 2 is hardly unerring. On multiplication problems, or
in choosing among health-care plans, people often make mistakes,
even if they are trying very hard.13
Nonetheless, System 1 is distinctly associated with identifiable
behavioral biases,14 producing a wide range of problems for policy and
law.15 People sometimes show “present bias,” focusing on the shortterm and downplaying the future.16 Most people tend to be
unrealistically optimistic.17 People use heuristics—or mental
shortcuts—that usually work well, but that sometimes lead them in

different perspectives on intuitions, or System 1, agree that educated and trained people often
make excellent, rapid decisions).
10. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 49, 51 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
11. See generally GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & ABC RESEARCH GRP., SIMPLE
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999) (discussing the use of intuitive heuristics to make
quick but effective decisions); GERD GIGERENZER, SIMPLY RATIONAL (2015) (same).
12. See generally GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS
(1998) (exploring how individuals with on-the-job experience make intuitive decisions in difficult
circumstances).
13. See generally Eric J. Johnson, Ran Hassin, Tom Baker, Allison T. Bajger & Galen
Treuer, Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value of Choice Architecture,
PLOS ONE (Dec. 18, 2013), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/asset?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.
pone.0081521.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPX4-2QS8] (concluding that individuals using online
exchanges are not very good at choosing the most cost-effective health insurance plan).
14. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 8, at 7; Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 10, at 53–54. For
catalogues of relevant findings, see generally BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF PREFERENCES,
CHOICES, AND HAPPINESS (Shinsuke Ikeda et al. eds., 2015) (cataloguing a wide range of biases);
COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT
AND MEMORY (Rüdiger F. Pohl ed., 2004) (same).
15. For a range of demonstrations, see generally THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PUBLIC POLICY (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
16. For references and discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral
Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1842–52 (2013) (discussing present bias and
related biases).
17. See generally TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS: A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY
POSITIVE BRAIN (2011) (exploring the human tendency to be unrealistically optimistic).
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unfortunate directions.18 With respect to probability, people’s
intuitions may go badly wrong, in the sense that they produce serious
mistakes, including life-altering ones.19 To be sure, our intuitions are
both adequate and helpful in the situations in which we ordinarily find
ourselves.20 But there is no question that intuitions can badly misfire,21
and that good nudges, and good choice architecture, will often provide
indispensable assistance, by helping people move in directions that
they themselves prefer.22 The regulatory and legal systems often
respond.23
Educative nudges, offered by government agencies, should be
seen as attempts to strengthen the hand of System 2 by improving the

18. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 8, at 7.
19. For a powerful demonstration, see Daniel L. Chen, Tobias J. Moskowitz & Kelly Shue,
Decision-Making Under the Gambler’s Fallacy: Evidence from Asylum Judges, Loan Officers,
and Baseball Umpires 12–26 (Jan. 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538147
[https://perma.cc/W8H2-STE2]
(showing
that
decisionmakers often try to make sure that in small samples, the percentage of favorable and
unfavorable outcomes tracks what would be observed in large samples).
20. This position is vigorously defended in GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 11, at 6. For a
broader discussion, see generally MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE (2011) (exploring
apparently competing positions about whether heuristics produce systematic biases or are instead
essentially accurate). In my view, the outcome of this occasionally heated debate within
psychology does not have strong implications for law and policy. Everyone agrees that heuristics
generally work well; that is why they exist. On that count, there is no opposition between the
supposedly competing sides. Everyone agrees that heuristics are generally fast and frugal.
Everyone also agrees that in important cases, boundedly rational people make mistakes.
Everyone should also agree that in important cases, excellent (in the sense of useful and generally
accurate) heuristics produce errors. When they make mistakes, some kind of nudge, or an
improvement in choice architecture, might help. To be sure, the best nudge may or may not
involve education or some kind of “boost.” See generally Ralph Hertwig & M.D. Ryall, Nudge vs.
Boost: Agency Dynamics Under “Libertarian Paternalism” (Jan. 1, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711166 [https://perma.cc/
W8H2-STE2] (defining boosts and exploring some of their potential advantages).
21. In the context of household finance, see generally John Y. Campbell, Restoring Rational
Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation, 106 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 1 (2016) (cataloguing household errors and calling for various forms of intervention,
including mandates, to correct them).
22. For a powerful demonstration, see Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Søren Leth-Petersen,
Torben Nielsen & Tore Olsen, Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowdout in Retirement Savings
Accounts: Evidence from Denmark 40–43 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
18565, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18565 [https://perma.cc/9TDQ-Y63Z] (finding large
effects from automatic enrollment in savings plans). For overviews, see generally HALPERN, supra
note 6 (outlining initiatives of the Behavioural Insights Team in the United Kingdom); Raj
Chetty, Behavioral Economics and Public Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective, 105 AM. ECON. REV.
1 (2015) (suggesting an assortment of policies informed by behavioral economics).
23. For recent illustrations, see generally HALPERN, supra note 1; JONES ET AL., supra note
1.
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role of deliberation and people’s considered judgments.24 The most
obvious example is disclosure of relevant information.25 Some kinds of
nudges, sometimes described as “boosts,” attempt to improve people’s
capacity to make choices for themselves, for example by improving
statistical literacy.26
Noneducative nudges are designed to appeal to, or to enlist,
System 1.27 Graphic health warnings can be seen as an example, at least
if they are not understood as having the purpose or effect of
education.28 We might distinguish between System 2 disclosures,
designed simply to give people factual information and ask them to
process it, and System 1 disclosures, designed to work on the automatic
system (for example, by inculcating fear or hope).29 Some nudges do
not appeal to System 1, strictly speaking, but turn out to work because
of their operation—as, for example, where default rules have large
effects in part because of the power of inertia,30 or where the ordering

24. For many examples, see generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 1 (exploring educative nudges
used by the U.S. government, including labels of various kinds); Till Grüne-Yanoff & Ralph
Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost: How Coherent Are Policy and Theory?, 26 MINDS & MACHINES
149 (2016) (discussing the idea of “boosts” and exploring some of the reasons that they might be
preferred).
25. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009
contains several examples. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). They
are outlined, and their effects are discussed, in Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Neale
Mahoney & Johannes Stroebel, Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from Credit
Cards (Aug. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2330942 [https://perma.cc/6CTP-AYTP] (finding that the CARD Act has saved consumers
over $12 billion annually). See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 6 (offering a variety of
illustrations).
26. See generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24 (exploring the value of
interventions that boost people’s capacities).
27. RICCARDO REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES 6 (2012). Rebonato actually defines
libertarian paternalism in a way that fits with what I am calling System 1 nudges, seeing it as “the
set of interventions aimed at overcoming the unavoidable cognitive biases and decisional
inadequacies of an individual by exploiting them.” Id. In the same vein, see Grüne-Yanoff &
Hertwig, supra note 24, at 149–51.
28. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 47 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 696 F.3d
1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). For an excellent discussion, see generally Christine Jolls, Product Warnings,
Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of Tobacco Regulation, 169 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 53 (2013) (finding that graphic warnings can actually make people better
informed).
29. See Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113
MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1022–25 (2015) (noting differences between System 1 disclosures and System
2 disclosures and suggesting that the former might be more effective).
30. See Johnson et al., supra note 13, at 5 (exploring the power of default rules and the role
of inertia).
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of items on a menu affects what people choose, because of the selective
nature of attention.31 Nudges of this kind can be seen as “exploiting”
the operations of System 1,32 though it would be more neutral to say
that they take account of those operations, acknowledging that some
form of choice architecture, likely affecting System 1, is inevitable.33
As I understand them here, System 2 nudges are specifically
designed to increase people’s capacity to exercise their own agency. On
ethical and other grounds, they might seem better for that reason.34 As
Jeremy Waldron writes, “I wish, though, that I could be made a better
chooser rather than having someone on high take advantage (even for
my own benefit) of my current thoughtlessness and my shabby
intuitions.”35
In the abstract, Waldron’s wish is an honorable one,36 and some
nudges are specifically designed to fulfill it. But as a matter of principle,
the challenge arises when it is costly and difficult to make people better
31. See Eran Dayan & Maya Bar-Hillel, Nudge to Nobesity II: Menu Positions Influence
Food Orders, 6 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 333, 333 (2011) (demonstrating effects of
position on a menu); Daniel R. Feenberg, Ina Ganguli, Patrick Gaule & Jonathan Gruber, It’s
Good To Be First: Order Bias in Reading and Citing NBER Working Papers (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21141, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21141
[https://perma.cc/K2XU-WY5K] (showing that people are more likely to read and cite academic
papers that come first in a list).
32. See REBONATO, supra note 27, at 6 (suggesting that nudges exploit behavioral biases).
33. For a sustained argument that because of market pressures, System 1 nudges from the
private sector are endemic in a market economy, see generally AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note
5 (discussing how market pressures lead sellers to exploit ignorance and cognitive biases).
It is true and important that all System 1 nudges are not the same, and that people might
reasonably distinguish among them. It would be possible to be skeptical about graphic health
warnings and to approve of automatic enrollment, and vice versa. One might think, for example,
that graphic warnings do not treat people with sufficient respect and that automatic enrollment is
a valuable time-saver, or instead think that graphic warnings are informative and unobjectionable,
see Jolls, supra note 28, at 57–58, and that automatic enrollment exploits people’s tendency toward
inertia. It is also true that System 2 nudges might have meaningful differences; a simplified
disclosure could be better or worse than a more complicated one.
I am bracketing these various complexities here. Further work might test whether
particular kinds of System 1 nudges attract particular support or disapproval and exactly why.
Some preliminary evidence on this count can generally be found in Janice Y. Jung & Barbara A.
Mellers, American Attitudes Toward Nudges, 11 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 62 (2016)
(finding general support for nudges) and also in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE
(2016) (same).
34. This idea is called into question by the illuminating discussion in Andrés Moles, Nudging
for Liberals, 41 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 644 (2015).
35. Jeremy Waldron, It’s All for Your Own Good, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/09/cass-sunstein-its-all-your-own-good
[https://perma.cc/4MXL-ZYN2].
36. REBONATO, supra note 27, is in a similar vein.
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choosers—and when the net benefits of a System 1 nudge are far higher
than the net benefits of a System 2 nudge.37 System 1 nudges, such as
automatic enrollment, make life much simpler, and that is no small
gain.38 There is also evidence that System 2 nudges can affect beliefs
without affecting behavior, and that System 1 nudges can be more
effective in altering what people actually do.39 The choice between
System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges raises pervasive and
fundamental questions about agency, freedom, and welfare.
My primary goal in this Article is to report the results of a
nationally representative survey designed to elicit people’s preferences
as between System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges in diverse contexts.40
Administered by Survey Sampling International, the survey included
more than 2,800 Americans, who were paid for their participation. As
we shall see, I also conducted a series of clarifying surveys on Amazon
Mechanical Turk,41 but my emphasis will be on the nationally
representative survey. In brief, seven different groups, each consisting
of more than four hundred people, were asked to register their
37. Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 429, 430 (2011)
(arguing that financial education does not work and that other approaches, such as automatic
enrollment, are better). See generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24 (identifying some
limits and costs of nudges).
38. See generally SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY (2013)
(emphasizing that poverty, hunger, loneliness, and time-management problems create what they
call cognitive “scarcity,” creating a bandwidth problem that can impair decisions).
39. See Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim & Annamaria Lusardi, The Effect of
Financial Education on the Quality of Decision Making 5–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 20618, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20618 [https://perma.cc/H8YCDQF5] (exploring the mixed effects of financial education on decision making).
40. Three other studies with different designs have explored this question. See generally
Gidon Felsen, Noah Castelo & Peter B. Reiner, Decisional Enhancement and Autonomy: Public
Attitudes Toward Overt and Covert Nudges, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 202 (2013)
(testing people’s attitude toward employment prospects, and finding generally high levels of
approval of System 2 nudges); Jung & Mellers, supra note 33 (finding that, on bounded scales,
people generally prefer System 2 nudges); Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein, The People’s
Perspective on Libertarian-Paternalistic Policies (July 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.tau.ac.il/~aradayal/LP.pdf [https://perma.cc/C95Y-MKLD] (finding evidence of
“reactance” against System 1 nudges and some inclination to prefer System 2 nudges). The
findings in this Article are broadly compatible with those in these earlier papers. At the same
time, the present survey is (so far as I am aware) the first to ask people to make an extended series
of direct choices between System 1 and System 2 nudges (though Arad and Rubinstein do ask
several questions that provide some evidence on that issue).
41. The sample on Amazon Mechanical Turk is not nationally representative. For discussion,
see Connor Huff & Dustin Tingley, “Who Are These People?” Evaluating the Demographic
Characteristics and Political Preferences of MTurk Survey Respondents, RES. & POL., July–Sept.
2015, at 1. Note that in my surveys, the results on Amazon Mechanical Turk are quite close to the
results in the nationally representative survey, where the same questions were asked.

SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

PEOPLE PREFER SYSTEM 2 NUDGES

9/21/2016 3:18 PM

131

preferences as between System 1 and System 2 nudges. Respondents
were asked to choose between a System 1 nudge, which involved either
a graphic warning or a default rule, and a System 2 nudge, which
involved some form of education.
The central question was whether people preferred educative or
noneducative nudges in a pairwise comparison on each topic. Four of
the pairs involved areas in which nudges have often been used as policy
tools: savings, smoking, clean energy, and water conservation.42 In
many ways, these pairs, which serve as the focus of Part II, can be seen
as standard, illustrating as they do dilemmas that can be found in
multiple domains. Three other pairs, which serve as the focus for Part
III, involved areas that raise highly distinctive issues and concerns:
voter registration, childhood obesity, and abortion.43
With respect to the four standard issues, the first finding is that, in
a neutral condition in which participants received no information about
the effectiveness of System 1 or System 2 nudges, a majority of
respondents preferred the System 2 nudge. Notably, however, a strong
minority—between 26 percent and 45 percent—favored System 1
nudges. In the neutral condition, two of the four issues produced no
significant differences among Democrats, Republicans, and
independents. And while two of the issues did produce such
differences, with a higher percentage of Democrats favoring System 1
nudges, the differences were relatively small.
The second finding is that when people were asked to assume that
System 1 nudges were “significantly more effective,” many of the
respondents shifted their preference to such nudges—but the shift was
relatively modest, usually in the vicinity of about 12 percentage points.
The third finding is surprising: when people were presented with
specific numbers offering a quantitative demonstration that System 1
nudges were more effective, the shift in the direction of System 1
nudges was essentially the same in magnitude. The fourth and final
finding is also surprising: when people were asked to assume that

42. I borrow the water conservation example from Jung & Mellers, supra note 33, at 67.
43. Note that the various questions asked people abstractly about policies; they did not
personalize those policies by suggesting that the policies would apply to “you.” There is some
intriguing evidence that when people see an arguably paternalistic nudge as applying to them
personally, they are less likely to support it. See generally James F.M. Cornwell & David H.
Krantz, Public Policy for Thee, but Not for Me: Varying the Grammatical Person of Public Policy
Justifications Influences Their Support, 9 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 433 (2014) (showing
lower levels of support for nudges directed at “you”). An important paper, however, does not
find any such effect in general. See Jung & Mellers, supra note 33, at 70–71 (finding no such effect).
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System 2 nudges were “significantly more effective,” there was no shift
in the direction of those nudges. This is a mystery, and I will attempt to
explain it.
The most obvious interpretation of these findings is that in
important contexts, most participants want to protect and promote
people’s agency, so they will favor System 2 nudges44—but many also
care about effectiveness, and so will turn to System 1 nudges if the
evidence shows that they are significantly better. At the same time,
there is significant heterogeneity within the American population.
Many people prefer System 1 nudges, perhaps on the ground that they
are more effective, perhaps on the ground that they make life simpler
and easier. Some people appear not to have any abstract preference as
between System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges; they appear to care
only about effectiveness.45 By contrast, some people have a strong
preference for System 2 nudges, and will require compelling evidence
of superior effectiveness to switch to favoring System 1 nudges.
Because a significant number of Americans show no inclination to
prefer System 1 nudges even when asked to assume that they are
clearly more effective, we can safely say that some segment of the
population would demand very powerful evidence to favor System 1
nudges—and perhaps no evidence would be sufficient.46 I shall offer
some concrete evidence to this effect.47
With respect to the three distinctive issues—increasing voter
registration, combatting childhood obesity, and discouraging
abortions—the patterns are illuminatingly different. In the neutral
condition, a majority of respondents did not favor System 2 nudges for
the first two issues. On the contrary, automatic voter registration had
clear majority support, and for childhood obesity, a majority deemed

44. There is a relationship here with the finding of a “control premium” described generally
in Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez, Cass R. Sunstein & Tali Sharot, Are Choosers Losers? The
Propensity to Under-Delegate in the Face of Potential Gains and Losses (Feb. 15, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733142 [https://
perma.cc/G4GB-NRPY] (finding that people will sacrifice money to maintain control, even when
their own information suggests that it is in their interest to delegate).
45. See Arad & Rubinstein, supra note 40, at 18–19 (finding that many people fall into this
category for certain nudges).
46. Note, however, that most Americans do support System 1 nudges, as for example in the
context of graphic warnings for cigarettes and graphic campaigns to deter distracted driving and
childhood obesity. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 132. The point here is that in a pairwise
comparison, Americans tend to prefer System 2 nudges.
47. See infra Table 17.
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cafeteria design48 to be preferable to parental education. Asking
people to assume the significantly greater effectiveness of the System
1 nudge does increase the level of support, but it is high even without
that information. The best explanations for the preference for System
1 nudges involve people’s judgments about the protection of the
franchise (arguing in favor of automatic registration) and the
protection of children (favoring cafeteria design).
With respect to reducing the number of abortions, a majority of
respondents consistently favored System 2 nudges, and that preference
did not shift when people were asked to assume that System 1 nudges
were more effective—undoubtedly because of a belief, on the part of
many, that it is not appropriate for public officials to appeal to System
1 nudges to discourage women from making their own choices.
Notably, Republicans, Democrats, and independents all favored
System 2 nudges in the abortion setting, although in most conditions,
the level of support for System 1 nudges was significantly lower among
Democrats. The sharp distinction between majority approval of a
System 1 nudge for increasing voter registration and majority approval
of a System 2 nudge for discouraging abortions attests to the
importance of people’s judgments about whether a right is at stake—
and whether a nudge is promoting or undermining it.
The findings from the seven surveyed issues support a variety of
conclusions. In important areas of regulatory policy, including
environmental protection, savings, and health, a majority of Americans
will prefer System 2 nudges to System 1 nudges, but there is likely to
be significant division on that issue. If System 1 nudges are shown to
be more effective, there will be an increase in preference for those
nudges, but the increase will not be as dramatic as might be anticipated,
apparently because some people put a high premium on personal
agency. Insofar as children are involved, System 1 nudges will be more
welcome, and the same is true if System 1 nudges facilitate people’s
ability to enjoy something that qualifies as a right. If, on the other hand,
any kind of nudge is compromising what people regard as a right, it will
be rejected, and a System 2 nudge will be preferred because it shows
greater respect for individual agency.
In important respects, the survey findings are consistent with what
emerges from a more sustained analysis of the normative issues; I
sketch the central ingredients of that analysis here. Both the findings
48. For the best discussion, see generally BRIAN WANSINK, SLIM BY DESIGN (2014)
(exploring the effects of choice architecture in producing obesity).
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and the analysis bear on a variety of issues in law and policy. They
suggest identifiable reasons to prefer System 2 nudges, such as
disclosure of statistical information or some kind of education. But
they also suggest that in many contexts, System 1 nudges such as
default rules are preferable, certainly if the goal is to increase welfare.49
One reason is that System 1 nudges may be more effective; a more
important reason is that they might have higher net benefits, and thus
be the best way to increase welfare.50 It might be tempting to think that
System 1 nudges are objectionable because they reduce autonomy, but
as we shall see, such nudges may actually increase autonomy. This is
not least because they may make people rights-holders by default (as
in the case of automatic voter registration), and also because they leave
people with the time and bandwidth to focus on their most
fundamental concerns.
As we shall also see, System 1 might be inclined to favor System 2
nudges: that is, people may well have an immediate, automatic sense
that educative nudges are better. On this point, System 2 will
frequently concur. But for many rights and interests, System 2 will
ultimately decide that System 1 nudges are best on both welfare and
autonomy grounds.
II. FOUR STANDARD ISSUES: SMOKING, SAVINGS, POLLUTION, AND
WATER CONSERVATION
My goal in this Part is to explore the principal survey itself. Let us
begin with some additional remarks about methodology.
The first four questions asked people to say whether they
preferred a System 1 or System 2 nudge in the context of some familiar
interventions in law and policy.51 I describe these issues as “standard”
because they come up frequently in discussions of nudges and

49. Bubb, supra note 29, at 1026; Willis, supra note 37, at 432 (arguing that default rules are
preferable to financial education).
50. I am bracketing the question of how best to define that contested concept. See generally
MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELFARE AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
(2012) (exploring the idea of social welfare in great detail.)
51. See generally Felix Ebeling & Sebastian Lotz, Domestic Uptake of Green Energy
Promoted by Opt-Out Tariffs, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 868 (2015), http://www.nature.com/
nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate2681.html [https://perma.cc/E7KP-XAB8] (finding
large effects from automatic enrollment in green energy); Jolls, supra note 28 (suggesting that
graphic warnings are helpful in informing people); Chetty et al., supra note 22 (finding large
effects from automatic enrollment in savings plans).
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behavioral economics, and because they do not raise distinctive issues
about individual rights. Here are the four pairs:
Which of these policies do you prefer, as part of an antismoking campaign?
1) Graphic warnings, with vivid pictures

2) Purely factual information, giving

of people who are sick from cancer.

people statistical information about the
risks from smoking.

Which of these policies do you prefer, as part of a campaign to encourage people to
save for retirement?
1) Automatic enrollment of employees in

2) Financial literacy programs at the

savings plans, subject to “opt out” if

workplace, so that employees are

employees do not want to participate.

educated about retirement options.

Which of these policies do you prefer, as part of a program to reduce pollution?
1) Automatic enrollment of customers in

2) Educational campaigns so that

slightly more expensive “green”

consumers can learn the advantages of

(environmentally friendly) energy, subject

green (environmentally friendly) energy.

to “opt out” if customers want another,
slightly less expensive energy source.
Which of these policies do you prefer, as a way of encouraging water conservation?
1) The government requires hotels to

2) The government requires hotels to

select a default policy of “environment-

provide guests with information about an

friendly rooms” in which towels left on

“environment-friendly” policy in which

the racks are not washed. If people want

towels left on the racks are not washed.

their towels washed, they can tell the

People are encouraged to choose to take

front desk, and their towels will be

part, but if they do not choose to do so,

washed daily.

their towels will be washed every day.

A. Respondents in the Neutral Condition (Condition 1)
In a neutral condition, in which people were provided with no
information about the effectiveness of System 1 or System 2 nudges,
majorities consistently showed a clear preference for System 2 nudges.
The aggregate data look like this:
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Table 1: Preferences as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge
When Given No Information About Their Effectiveness
Percentage of Respondents (n=430) Who:
Issue

Prefer System 1 Nudge

Prefer System 2 Nudge

Smoking

45%

55%

Savings

43%

57%

Energy

26%

74%

Water

32%

68%

The preference for System 2 nudges is strongest in the cases of
pollution reduction and water conservation. With respect to reducing
pollution, the likely judgment is that it is better for people to learn and
make their own choices than for them to be defaulted into an energy
source that might turn out to be more expensive or less reliable. (I will
turn to potential political divisions in Part II.E.) Participants might well
have been concerned that people would not take the trouble to opt out
and thus face higher electricity bills without their explicit consent.52 In
the case of water conservation, money is not involved, but more people
also favored System 2 nudges, perhaps because of a concern about
defaulting guests into a situation that might not be in their interest
(involving unwashed and perhaps dirty towels).53
Although majority preference for System 2 nudges is consistent,
large numbers of people do favor System 1 nudges in all four contexts.
One reason might be that many participants believe System 1 nudges
to be more effective, so long as no information is provided on that
question. The 45 percent of respondents who preferred graphic
warnings for cigarettes might well have believed that, if the goal is to
address a serious public-health problem, such warnings are more likely
to work than purely factual information. Another reason might be that
some System 1 nudges seem to impose lower decisionmaking burdens
on choosers, as in the cases of default rules for saving, energy, and
water conservation. If a System 1 nudge makes things a great deal
easier for people, and does not require them to act, it might appear to

52. Note, however, that most Americans do support automatic enrollment in green energy.
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 121–22.
53. Compare here the analogous finding that while most Americans reject the automatic
registration of people as organ donors, they favor the forced choice of whether to be organ donors
when they receive their driver’s licenses. See id.
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be preferable.54 System 2 nudges, by contrast, seem to require a larger
apparatus (consider financial education), and a greater investment of
time and attention from choosers.
B. Respondents Informed that the System 1 Nudge Is “Significantly
More Effective” (Condition 2)
In the neutral condition, people’s preferences could have any
number of sources. To obtain some understanding of what motivated
those preferences, a different group of people was asked to assume that
the System 1 nudge was “significantly more effective” with respect to
each of the four goals. The hypothesis was that these three words would
lead to a major increase in the percentage of people who preferred
System 1 nudges.
The hypothesis was confirmed, but in a qualified way:
Table 2: Preferences as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge
When the System 1 Nudge Is “Significantly More Effective”
Percentage of Respondents Who Prefer System 1 Nudge
Told that System 1 Nudge Is
“Significantly More Effective”
Issue

Neutral Condition (n = 430)

(n = 407)

Smoking

45%

57%

Savings

43%

55%

Energy

26%

38%

Water

32%

42%

There are two noteworthy results here. First, the shift toward
System 1 nudges is statistically significant for all four issues (using chisquare analysis, two-tailed p < 0.05 for each question), but it is not
massive.55 Second, the shift is essentially the same for all four questions.
Indeed, it is remarkably consistent, with no significant differences
across questions. When people are informed of the greater

54. See THALER, supra note 3, at 339–43 (discussing automatic enrollment and Save More
Tomorrow plans); see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE (2015)
(exploring why people might rationally choose not to choose).
55. Statistical significance was defined as p < 0.05, using the Mann-Whitney U test to test
whether the changes between different survey conditions were significant. That is, it tested the
null hypothesis that there was no change between survey conditions against an alternative
hypothesis that there was an increase or decrease from one survey condition to another.
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effectiveness of System 1 nudges, support for System 1 nudges
increases by ten to twelve percentage points.
We do not have enough data to speak of anything like an iron law
here, but it is not too speculative to say that many people tend to think
that System 2 nudges will be more effective or will serve as a better way
to respect people’s agency—but they will shift when they receive
information about the comparative effectiveness of System 1 nudges.
At the same time, many people (usually 40 percent or more) will have
some degree of commitment, visceral or otherwise, to the superiority
of the System 2 nudge.56 The addition of three words (“significantly
more effective”) is not enough to change that commitment.
C. Respondents Informed that the System 1 Nudge Is “Significantly
More Effective,” with Quantitative Information (Condition 3)
The words “significantly more effective” have a high degree of
opacity. It is not clear what they mean. Once they are specified in
quantitative terms, they might have a stronger or weaker impact.
Suppose, for example, that people are told to assume that automatic
enrollment would increase participation in savings plans from 40
percent to 90 percent, or that graphic warnings would save 200,000 lives
annually—but that the System 2 alternatives would have essentially no
impact. Under those assumptions, it would not be easy to reject the
idea that System 1 nudges are better. To reject that idea, one would
have to have concerns about the outcomes (saving lives is good, but the
value of increased participation in savings plans is less obvious), or to
put a very high premium indeed on a certain conception of personal
agency.57 Alternatively, a System 1 nudge might be “significantly”
more effective in a statistical sense, but its comparative advantage
might be modest. If so, we might expect to see the same results as in
the neutral condition—or even a movement in the direction of System
2 nudges.
To understand the effects of quantitative information, participants
were asked to assume specified numerical disparities in favor of System

56. The survey did not directly measure the strength of people’s commitments; it asked for
preferences and did not measure their intensity.
57. On the complexities here, see generally Luc Bovens, The Ethics of Nudge, in
PREFERENCE CHANGE 207 (Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson eds., 2009) (exploring
whether nudges are consistent with respect for autonomy); Moles, supra note 34 (defending much
nudging as respectful of autonomy).
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1 nudges—not so stark as in the examples just given, but nonetheless
lopsided.
• Antismoking Campaign: “Assume that [the System 1 nudge] is
far more effective. It reduces smoking by 20 percent, while [the
System 2 nudge] reduces smoking by 5 percent.”
• Encouraging Retirement Savings: “Assume that [the System 1
nudge] is far more effective. It leads 90 percent of workers to
enroll in savings plans, whereas [the System 2 nudge] leads only
55 percent to enroll in such plans.”
• Reducing Pollution: “Assume that [the System 1 nudge] is far
more effective. It cuts pollution by 40 percent, whereas [the
System 2 nudge] cuts pollution by just 5 percent.”
• Encouraging Water Conservation: “Assume that [the System 1
nudge] is far more effective. On average it cuts water use from
washing towels by 70 percent, whereas [the System 2 nudge] cuts
water use from washing towels by 10 percent.”
Here are the results:
Table 3: Preferences as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge
When the System 1 Nudge Is “Significantly More Effective,” with
Quantitative Information
Percentage of Respondents Who Prefer System 1 Nudge
Told that System 1

Told that System 1

Nudge Is

Nudge Is More

“Significantly

Effective, with

Neutral Condition

More Effective”

Quantification

Issue

(n = 430)

(n = 407)

(n = 435)

Smoking

45%

57%

58%

Savings

43%

55%

56%

Energy

26%

38%

43%

Water

32%

42%

47%

It should be clear that the quantitative information did not have a
larger effect than the words “significantly more effective.” Quite
surprisingly, that information produced no statistically significant
changes. One reason may be that the numerical differences were not
particularly extreme; they plausibly reflected the kind of disparity that
a purely qualitative account (“significantly more effective”) would
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suggest. If so, the numbers provided no additional information.
Another reason may be that the people who favored System 2 nudges,
even in the face of a qualitative explanation that it would be less
effective, did so because of a strong preference for what they saw as
personal agency, and hence could not be moved even by fairly
impressive numbers. It is natural to wonder whether a difference
between the qualitative and the quantitative information would
emerge in a between-subjects design, and I answer that question below.
(To spoil the surprise: it does.58)
D. Respondents Informed that the System 2 Nudge Is “Significantly
More Effective” (Condition 4)
If it is assumed that System 2 nudges are “significantly more
effective,” we might expect that very large majorities would endorse
them. If a nudge increases people’s own capacities and also produces
the desired result, it would seem far preferable to a less effective
intervention that does not educate people in any way. The principal
qualification is that, if a nudge is effective in producing a result that
people do not like, then they will of course reject it for that very reason.
(Most people would not like a nudge that is effective in encouraging
people to use illegal drugs or to text while driving.) I will turn to this
point below.
To test this hypothesis, I asked survey respondents whether they
preferred System 1 or System 2 nudges on the assumption that the
System 2 nudges were “significantly more effective.” Here are the
results:
Table 4: Preferences as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge
When the System 2 Nudge Is “Significantly More Effective”
Percentage of Respondents Who Prefer System 1 Nudge
Told that System 2 Nudge Is
“Significantly More Effective”
Issue

Neutral Condition (n = 430)

(n = 435)

Smoking

45%

43%

Savings

43%

44%

Energy

26%

26%

Water

32%

29%

58. See infra Table 15.
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Most surprisingly, the assumption of the comparatively greater
effectiveness of System 2 nudges does not produce any shift in their
direction. The numbers are essentially identical—a highly unexpected
finding. Any explanation remains speculative, but it is possible that
those who supported System 2 nudges already assumed that they would
be more effective, so the three additional words added no new
information. Alternatively, some people might think that System 1
nudges have some independent advantage (for example, because they
operate automatically and cheaply), or that System 2 nudges have some
independent disadvantage (for example, because they require a greater
investment in time and attention). System 1 supporters might have
stronger preferences than System 2 supporters and thus may be less
likely to be persuaded by effectiveness arguments.59 For example,
automatic enrollment in a savings plan might be more desirable than
financial literacy programs, simply because it does not impose the costs
and burdens of the latter. The same is true of automatic enrollment in
green energy. It is also true that most people already prefer System 2
nudges and hence fewer people are available to be moved.
Some of these possibilities suggest that the lack of an effect from
assuming that System 2 nudges are more effective is similar to the lack
of effect of the quantitative information.60 Some people prefer System
1 nudges even if they believe them to be less effective. They might be
engaging in some kind of informal cost-benefit analysis (a point to
which I will return). It is also reasonable to ask whether we would
observe the same results in a within-subjects design—that is, where
participants see and answer all of the questions within a survey—a
question answered in Part IV. (More surprise spoiling: we do not
observe the same results.61)
E. Respondent Preferences by Partisan Affiliation
Earlier work strongly suggests that in general, partisan divisions
do not explain people’s judgments about nudges.62 What matters is the

59. I am grateful to Ralph Hertwig for help with the ideas in this paragraph.
60. See supra Part II.C.
61. See infra Table 15.
62. See Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 7), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2604084 {https://perma.cc/43AG-A8DP]; David
Tannenbaum, Craig Fox & Todd Rogers, On the Misplaced Politics of Behavioral Policy
Interventions 10 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://home.uchicago.edu/davetannenbaum/
documents/partisan%20nudge%20bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3AL-Z4SC] (finding that people
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valence of the particular nudge.63 In other words, Republicans do not
like nudges more or less than Democrats do; within limits, they tend to
like nudges that steer people in directions of which they approve, and
the same is true of Democrats.64 Do political affiliations explain
people’s preferences for System 1 or System 2 nudges? Here are the
results in full:
Table 5: Preferences as Between System 1 and System 2 Nudges by
Partisan Affiliation (Condition 1)
Percentage of Respondents Who:
Prefer System 1 Nudge

Prefer System 2 Nudge

Issue

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

Smoking

50%

44%

40%

50%

56%

60%

Savings

42%

48%

39%

58%

52%

61%

Energy

34%

24%

19%

66%

76%

81%

Water

42%

27%

26%

58%

73%

74%

Note: Respondents were: 163 Democrats, 142 Republicans, and 125 independents.

Table 6: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the System 1 Nudge
Is “Significantly More Effective” (Condition 2)
Percentage of Respondents Who:
Prefer System 1 Nudge

Prefer System 2 Nudge

Issue

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

Smoking

62%

57%

52%

38%

43%

48%

Savings

60%

55%

49%

40%

45%

51%

Energy

48%

31%

34%

52%

69%

66%

Water

51%

36%

38%

49%

64%

62%

Note: Respondents were: 163 Democrats, 142 Republicans, and 125 independents.

do not, across political lines, like or dislike nudges in general; their judgments are based on their
own political attitudes).
63. SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 151, 158 (exploring partisan similarities and differences);
Jung & Mellers, supra note 33, at 72 (same); Sunstein, supra note 62, at 7 (same).
64. See Sunstein, supra note 62, at 19–20.
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Table 7: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the System 1 Nudge
Is “Significantly More Effective,” with Quantitative Information
(Condition 3)
Percentage of Respondents Who:
Prefer System 1 Nudge

Prefer System 2 Nudge

Issue

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

Smoking

61%

56%

56%

39%

44%

44%

Savings

58%

51%

57%

42%

49%

43%

Energy

47%

38%

42%

53%

62%

58%

Water

52%

41%

48%

48%

59%

52%

Note: Respondents were: 165 Democrats, 138 Republicans, and 132 independents.

Table 8: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the System 2 Nudge
Is “Significantly More Effective” (Condition 4)
Percentage of Respondents Who:
Prefer System 1 Nudge

Prefer System 2 Nudge

Issue

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

Smoking

53%

35%

39%

47%

65%

61%

Savings

47%

37%

47%

53%

63%

53%

Energy

28%

24%

25%

72%

76%

75%

Water

41%

20%

23%

59%

80%

77%

Note: Respondents were: 169 Democrats, 131 Republicans, and 133 independents.

There are many numbers here, but the basic story is
straightforward. A majority of Republicans, Democrats, and
independents all favor System 2 nudges, with just one qualification:
Democrats are evenly split with respect to antismoking nudges. Both
qualitative and quantitative information about the greater
effectiveness of System 1 nudges produces an increase of about 10 to
20 percent in favor of System 1 nudges—and essentially the same
degree of change is observed for all three groups. For all three groups,
the assumption that System 2 nudges are significantly more effective
produces results quite similar to those in the neutral condition.
Notably, none of the differences between Condition 1 and Condition
4, for any partisan affiliation, is statistically significant.65
65. In these cases, I could not reject the null hypothesis that the differences between
Condition 1 and Condition 4 were irrelevant for Democrats, Republicans, and independents. The
differences for Republican respondents for smoking and saving might look statistically significant,
but they are not.
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The largest and most important finding here is that in many of the
conditions, the differences among Democrats, Republicans, and
independents are not significant. Their judgments as between System
1 and System 2 nudges are broadly in line with one another. But in
some conditions, Democrats are more inclined to System 1 nudges than
are Republicans and independents. In all conditions, for example,
Democrats are more favorably disposed than Republicans or
independents to a System 1 nudge for water conservation; the
difference is statistically significant (p < 0.05). In Condition 2,
Democrats are more favorably disposed than Republicans or
Independents to a System 1 nudge for energy. In Condition 4,
Democrats are more favorably disposed than Republicans to a System
1 nudge for smoking.
We can offer some plausible explanations for these differences.
Democrats are comparatively more enthusiastic about green energy
and water conservation, and very possibly antismoking efforts as well;
to them, a System 1 nudge might seem more appealing if it is thought
to be more effective. Republicans might be more likely to favor a
System 2 nudge, especially for green energy or water conservation, to
preserve personal agency. Notably, however, there were no significant
differences among the three groups in terms of movements across
conditions.
There is a quite fundamental point here. When people are
enthusiastic about achieving the end result, they are probably more
likely to support a System 1 nudge; when they are doubtful about the
end, a System 2 nudge will seem preferable, above all because it is
better in terms of retaining personal agency. We shall now find more
evidence in this vein.
III. THREE DISTINCT ISSUES: VOTING, CHILDREN, AND ABORTION
The range of System 1 and System 2 nudges is of course
exceptionally wide. For example, some nudges promote rights by
making them easier to enjoy; consider, for example, simplified voter
registration. Some nudges involve children. Teachers impose mandates
on elementary school children, but they also nudge them in various
ways: to do their homework, to act courteously, and to avoid disrupting
classes. Some nudges discourage the use of rights. We could easily
imagine efforts to steer people away from certain religious practices,
or to discourage them from exercising their right to sexual privacy; proabstinence nudges are one example.
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A. Testing Preferences as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge
in the Context of the Three Distinctive Issues
As illustrations of these distinctive kinds of nudges, I tested
people’s judgments about voting, childhood obesity, and abortion. For
the neutral Condition 1, the three pairs looked like this:
Which of these policies do you prefer, as part of a program to increase voter registration?
1) Automatic voter registration, so that

2) A public education campaign to

when people receive their driver’s licenses,

convince people to register to vote.

and show they are domiciled in your state,
they are automatically registered as voters.
Which of these policies do you prefer, as part of a program to combat childhood obesity?
1) Redesigning school cafeterias so that

2) Educating parents about the problem

healthy, low-calorie options are in the

of childhood obesity and how to combat

most visible locations.

it.

Which of these policies do you prefer, as a means of discouraging abortions? (Please
indicate which you prefer even if you do not like either.)
1) Requiring pregnant women, before

2) Requiring pregnant women, before

having an abortion, to see vivid photos of

having an abortion, to speak briefly with

fetuses, designed to show that they are

a doctor about whether they really

merely very young children.

believe, on reflection, that an abortion is
the right choice, in light of the moral
issues involved.

Just as with the four standard questions from Part II, people
participating in Condition 2 were asked about their preference under
the assumption that the System 1 nudge was “significantly more
effective.” In Condition 4, participants were asked about their
preference under the assumption that the System 2 nudge was
“significantly more effective.” In terms of Condition 3, where the
assumption that the System 1 nudge was “significantly more effective”
was also supported by quantitative information, the survey questions
looked like this:
•

Increasing Voter Registration: “Which of these policies do you
prefer, as part of a program to increase voter registration?
Assume that 1) is significantly more effective in increasing
voter registration. It registers 40 percent of currently
unregistered voters and 2) registers 10 percent of currently
unregistered voters.”
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Combatting Childhood Obesity: “Which of these policies do
you prefer, as part of a program to combat childhood obesity?
Assume that 1) is far more effective. On average, it cuts caloric
consumption by 30 percent, whereas 2) cuts caloric
consumption by just 5 percent.”

•

Discouraging Abortions: “Which of these policies do you
prefer, as a means of discouraging abortions? Assume that 1) is
significantly more effective. It cuts the abortion rate by 30
percent, whereas 2) cuts the abortion rate by 5 percent. (Please
indicate which you prefer even if you do not like either.)”

B. General Results for the Preference as Between the System 1 and
System 2 Nudge in the Context of Three Distinctive Issues
The right to vote has a special resonance, and any effort to nudge
people to exercise that right is likely to attract significant support. The
right to choose abortion has a similar resonance, even if it is far more
controversial; an effort to nudge people to choose abortion, or not to
choose it, will raise questions that are unique to that context. The
question of childhood obesity is distinctive for a different reason: it
involves children, where System 1 nudges might be more acceptable.
(Parents appeal to System 1 all the time.66) We might expect that
majorities would be especially sympathetic to System 1 nudges to
encourage voting; especially unsympathetic to System 1 nudges to
discourage abortion; and especially sympathetic to System 1 nudges to
reduce childhood obesity. With some qualifications, that is what we
find.

66. I am confident that this proposition is true, but I might be somewhat unusual in actually
explaining System 1 and System 2 to my son, five years old at the time. He has a keen interest in
toys, and in my buying him more of them, even though he already has plenty. One day I explained
to him that though his System 1 wants more toys, his System 2 knows that he does not need them.
He understood the distinction immediately (though for a month or so he referred to his “Part 1”
and “Part 2”). After struggling with his emotions whenever we passed toy stores, he finally asked,
“Daddy, do I even have a System 2?”
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1. Increasing Voter Registration.
Most Americans prefer
automatic voter registration to efforts to encourage people to register.
The changes in assumptions do not produce statistically significant
changes in levels of support:
Table 9: Preference as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge
When the Nudge Aims to Increase Voter Registration
Percentage of Respondents Who:
Condition
1) Neutral
2) System 1 Nudge “Significantly
More Effective”

Prefer System 1 Nudge

Prefer System 2 Nudge

57%

43%

62%

38%

61%

39%

52%

48%

3) System 1 Nudge “Significantly
More Effective,” with Quantitative
Information
4)

System 2 Nudge “Significantly

More Effective”

There are two noteworthy findings here. The first is that a majority
prefers the System 1 nudge in all four conditions. The reason is
probably a strong (moral) judgment or intuition that people should be
voters by default; they should not have to take steps to attain that
status. The second is that with respect to automatic voter registration,
movements do not occur across the three conditions, as they sometimes
do for the four nudges previously discussed.67
2. Combatting Childhood Obesity. For childhood obesity, a small
majority favors cafeteria design over parental education, except when
people are asked to assume that the latter is significantly more
effective:

67. In particular, we observe movements from Condition 1 to Conditions 2 and 3 for the four
standard nudges discussed in Part II; no such movements are found here.
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Table 10: Preference as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge to
Combat Childhood Obesity
Percentage of Respondents Who:
Condition
1) Neutral
2) System 1 Nudge “Significantly
More Effective”

Prefer System 1 Nudge

Prefer System 2 Nudge

53%

47%

53%

47%

63%

37%

48%

52%

3) System 1 Nudge “Significantly
More Effective,” with Quantitative
Information
4) System 2 Nudge “Significantly
More Effective”

In the three “informed” conditions, only one shift is significant:
with quantitative information, there is an increase in support for
cafeteria design. In general, we do not find the same kinds of shifts as
are observed for the four more standard nudges.
3. Discouraging Abortions. For abortion, the System 2 nudge is
preferred by a substantial majority. (Note that for this question,
participants were specifically asked to choose one option even if they
did not like either, acknowledging that on that highly sensitive issue,
some respondents might reject both nudges.) The preference for the
System 2 nudge does not shift significantly across the four conditions:
Table 11: Preference as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge
When the Nudge Aims to Discourage Abortions
Percentage of Respondents Who:
Condition
1) Neutral
2) System 1 Nudge “Significantly
More Effective”

Prefer System 1 Nudge

Prefer System 2 Nudge

25%

75%

34%

66%

33%

67%

29%

71%

3) System 1 Nudge “Significantly
More Effective,” with Quantitative
Information
4) System 2 Nudge “Significantly
More Effective”
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The best explanation here is probably that, for an intensely
personal decision of this kind, most people do not want the government
to attempt to move people by engaging or exploiting System 1. If so,
movements across the conditions should not be expected. For many
people, of course, abortion is a morally questionable or unacceptable
choice, and for them, a System 1 nudge might seem better, either
because it is more likely to be effective or because it is a more pointed
and direct response to those who are considering that choice. Hence
the steady minority support for the System 1 nudge is also unsurprising.
C. Respondent Preferences by Partisan Affiliation
What is the role of political divisions? We might well expect that
it would be larger than in the four standard cases, and in some respects
it is, but the full story is not entirely straightforward. Here are the
results:
Table 12: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the Nudge Aims to
Increase Voter Registration
Percentage of Respondents Who:
Prefer System 1 Nudge
Condition
1) Neutral
2) System 1 Nudge
“Significantly More Effective”

Prefer System 2 Nudge

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

65%

53%

52%

35%

47%

43%

63%

53%

57%

37%

47%

43%

71%

54%

58%

29%

46%

42%

55%

53%

48%

45%

47%

52%

3) System 1 Nudge
“Significantly More Effective,”
with Quantitative Information
4) System 2 Nudge
“Significantly More Effective”
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Table 13: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the Nudge Aims to
Combat Childhood Obesity
Percentage of Respondents Who:
Prefer System 1 Nudge
Condition
1) Neutral
2) System 1 Nudge
“Significantly More Effective”

Prefer System 2 Nudge

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

61%

45%

51%

39%

54%

49%

59%

48%

52%

41%

52%

48%

70%

52%

67%

30%

48%

33%

51%

43%

49%

49%

57%

51%

3) System 1 Nudge
“Significantly More Effective,”
with Quantitative Information
4) System 2 Nudge
“Significantly More Effective”

Table 14: Preferences by Partisan Affiliation When the Nudge Aims to
Discourage Abortions
Percentage of Respondents Who:
Prefer System 1 Nudge
Condition
1) Neutral
2) System 1 Nudge
“Significantly More Effective”

Prefer System 2 Nudge

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

Dem.

Rep.

Indep.

20%

32%

23%

80%

68%

77%

30%

42%

29%

70%

58%

71%

25%

43%

31%

75%

57%

69%

24%

34%

30%

76%

66%

70%

3) System 1 Nudge
“Significantly More Effective,”
with Quantitative Information
4) System 2 Nudge
“Significantly More Effective”

The most consistent difference can be found in the area of
discouraging abortions, where higher percentages of Republicans are
more inclined to favor the System 1 nudge across all four conditions.
In three of the four conditions, the difference for that question is
statistically significant between Democrats and Republicans (the
exception is when respondents are told the System 2 nudge is
significantly more effective).68 For both increasing voter registration
and combatting childhood obesity, the difference between Democrats

68. Using chi-square analysis, two-tailed p < 0.05 for each question.
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and Republicans for the neutral condition is significant, and when they
have been informed that there is a quantitative advantage to a System
1 nudge, Democrats and independents show a significant difference for
voting. Republicans and independents show such a difference in
relation to abortion when told that System 1 nudges are significantly
more effective, both with and without actual numbers. Republicans
and independents show such a difference in relation to childhood
obesity when told that System 1 nudges are more effective with
numbers. Interestingly, there is no significant difference of any kind
when respondents are told that System 2 nudges are more effective.
Here as well, the details should not obscure the basic story: when
issues are politically contested, there is more likely to be a partisan
difference in terms of choice between System 1 and System 2 nudges.
Apparently it is the case that if people strongly support a particular
end, they will be more likely to support a System 1 nudge to attain it.69
I speculate that when the end seems especially important, the
overriding consideration is how best to achieve that end, and people
will favor the nudge that seems most likely to do that. Another
consideration, perhaps explaining some of the results here, is that when
people have an intense emotional reaction to some outcome (such as
the use of illegal drugs), they might well favor a System 1 response
(such as a graphic warning).
For the four standard cases in Part II, on the other hand, political
affiliation usually did not explain people’s choices between System 1
and System 2 nudges (with interesting exceptions, especially in the case
of reducing pollution). By contrast, political affiliation mattered much
more for abortion, voting, and childhood obesity. It would not, of
course, be surprising to find that Democrats are less supportive of prolife nudges than Republicans, or that Republicans are less enthusiastic
than Democrats about automatic voter registration or efforts to
combat childhood obesity.70
IV. DIGGING DEEPER INTO THE FINDINGS: FOLLOW-UP STUDIES
The nationally representative survey offers a great deal of
information about what people think, but it also leaves many mysteries.
Why, for example, did the neutral condition produce essentially the
69. If so, are people motivated by System 1 or by System 2? I believe that System 1 is the
right answer, but the current survey cannot prove the point.
70. See Sunstein, supra note 62, (manuscript at 10 tbl.2, 12 tbl.4, 19) (finding evidence to this
effect).
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same results as the “System 2 nudge is significantly more effective”
condition? Why did the “System 1 nudge is significantly more
effective” condition produce the same results as the condition in which
that advantage was displayed with impressive numbers? And why,
exactly, do some people favor System 1 nudges, and others favor
System 2 nudges?
To answer these questions, I conducted four follow-up studies, all
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The populations are not nationally
representative, and for that reason, the results must be taken with a
grain of salt.71 At the same time, the numbers in the neutral condition
are closely in line with the nationally representative survey. It is not
unreasonable to think that, in terms of the particular questions I am
exploring here, the results would hold up with a nationally
representative sample.
A. Testing Preferences with a Within-Subjects Design
The surveys discussed in Parts II and III involved a “betweensubjects” design. Different groups of participants saw different
conditions, rather than all of them at once. That design has significant
advantages, because it prevents contamination by previous answers. If
questions are seen in isolation, responses cannot be affected by order
effects, or by a particular factor that becomes highlighted only by virtue
of its clear difference from a previous question. In a sense, the answers
in a between-subjects design are pure, because a factor (say,
comparative effectiveness) will not assume more salience than it would
if people were looking at the conditions at the same time.
Nonetheless, there are also advantages to a “within-subjects”
design, by which participants see, and answer, all of the questions in
the same survey. For present purposes, the principal advantage is that
with a within-subjects design, it is possible to test whether people’s
original answers shift after they are given information about
comparative effectiveness. That question is important to test, because it
reveals whether some people are strongly committed to System 1 or
71. For some relevant characteristics of participants in Amazon Mechanical Turk studies,
see supra note 41. The advantage of nationally representative surveys is, of course, that they
involve a roughly accurate snapshot of the relevant public (in this case, the United States). By
contrast, participants in online surveys on Amazon Mechanical Turk are self-selected; they
choose to participate, and their judgments, interests, and values might be quite different from a
nationally representative group. In the surveys presented here, however, there are only modest
differences between participants in the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey and participants in the
nationally representative survey when the same questions were asked.
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System 2 nudges—so committed that they will stick with one or the
other even when effectiveness information stares them in the face.
With a within-subjects design, we can also cast light on two questions
raised by the between-subjects survey: (1) Does quantitative
information really make no difference to people? (2) Are people really
indifferent to whether System 2 nudges are significantly more
effective?
I used Amazon Mechanical Turk to ask about four hundred
people twenty-four questions, involving all of the areas tested above
(with the exception of abortion72). Here are the results:
Table 15: Within-Subjects Results for the Preference as Between the
System 1 and System 2 Nudge for Six of the Seven Issues Across the
Four Conditions
Percentage of Respondents Who Prefer the System 1 Nudge
Issue

1

2

3

4

Smoking

41%

57%

67%

30%

Savings

45%

58%

72%

28%

Energy

36%

50%

69%

19%

Water

42%

55%

67%

21%

Obesity

61%

71%

78%

29%

Voting

60%

66%

76%

34%

Several things are relatively clear. The most important is that the
pattern of responses is quite orderly. We see the general movements
that we should expect. Comparative effectiveness information in favor
of System 1 nudges increases support for System 1 nudges, quantitative
information increases support still further, and comparative
effectiveness information in favor of System 2 nudges increases support
for System 2 nudges. In the two latter respects, we observe movements

72. This area was excluded on the ground that it is highly controversial, and it is not clear
how much more would be learned in a within-subjects design. From the nationally representative
survey, we know that most people will oppose System 1 nudges to discourage abortion even in a
between-subjects design, and that the numbers do not move much across conditions. Because
people’s judgments about such nudges are likely to depend on their views about abortion (and
hence effectiveness information showing that System 1 nudges do in fact discourage abortion does
not move them), we do not expect major shifts in a within-subjects design. Admittedly, that
hypothesis remains to be tested.
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that make sense, and that are not found in the between-subjects
design.73
To offer a bit more detail: in general, the answers in the neutral
condition are fairly close to what was found in the nationally
representative sample. At the same time, and as anticipated, some of
the movements across conditions are greater. From the neutral
condition to the “System 1 nudge is significantly more effective”
condition, the movements are in line with those in the nationally
representative sample. But in the between-subjects design, the
quantitative information makes a real difference. And for all questions,
movements of at least 11 percent, and sometimes of more than 20
percent, can be found from the neutral condition to the “System 2
nudge is significantly more effective” condition. In this survey, then,
the differences among the conditions produced reliable shifts in
people’s views.
There are two important qualifications. First, at least one-third of
the population continued to favor the System 2 nudge in the withinsubjects condition, even when they were given numbers to support the
comparatively greater effectiveness of the System 1 nudge. That result
might be taken as surprising. Second, large percentages of people
(usually around one-quarter) continued to favor the System 1 nudge in
the within-subjects condition, even when they were informed that the
System 2 nudge was significantly more effective. That result also seems
surprising.
Although it does not involve a nationally representative sample,
the within-subjects study provides useful information. It suggests that
with information about greater comparative effectiveness, the number
of people who shift to System 1 nudges will probably be greater in a
within-subjects design—and that the appeal of the System 2 nudge will
also be heightened, in that design, with evidence of greater
effectiveness. At the same time, the within-subjects design fortifies the
general conclusion that a certain percentage of the population will
favor System 2 nudges even if they are significantly less effective, in
large part because of a commitment to a certain conception of
individual agency.
73. One reason involves “evaluability”: in a within-subjects design with multiple questions,
people can evaluate factors that might be hard to assess in the abstract. See Christopher Hsee,
The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate
Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 247,
255 (1996) (urging that when people are making decisions that involve joint presentations, they
can evaluate factors that might defy evaluation when options are presented separately).
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B. Testing Beliefs About Effectiveness, as Opposed to Preference
Both the between-subjects and the within-subjects designs ask
people to register their preferences. They do not test people’s
independent judgments about effectiveness. Asking people about
effectiveness should be illuminating: if people prefer System 2 nudges
even though they think that System 1 nudges would be more effective,
then we have good reason to think that a commitment to individual
agency, or something like that, is driving their judgments.
Using Amazon Mechanical Turk, I asked about four hundred
people the effectiveness question. The survey looked like this:
Which of these policies do you think would be more effective as part of an antismoking
campaign?
1) Graphic warnings, with vivid pictures of

2) Purely factual information, giving

people who are sick from cancer.

people statistical information about the
risks from smoking

Which of these policies do you think would be more effective as part of a campaign to
encourage people to save for retirement?
1) Automatic enrollment of employees in

2) Financial literacy programs at the

savings plans, subject to “opt out” if

workplace, so that employees are

employees do not want to participate.

educated about retirement options.

Which of these policies do you think would be more effective as part of a program to
reduce pollution?
1) Automatic enrollment of customers in

2) Educational campaigns so that

slightly more expensive “green”

consumers can learn the advantages of

(environmentally friendly) energy, subject

green (environmentally friendly) energy.

to “opt out” if customers want another,
slightly less expensive energy source.
Which of these policies do you think would be more effective at promoting water
conservation?
1) The government requires hotels to

2) The government requires hotels to

select a default policy of “environment-

provide guests with information about an

friendly rooms” in which towels left on the

“environment-friendly” policy in which

racks are not washed. If people want their

towels left on the racks are not washed.

towels washed, they can tell the front

People are encouraged to choose to take

desk, and their towels will be washed

part, but if they do not choose to do so,

daily.

their towels will be washed every day.
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Which of these policies do you think would be more effective in combatting childhood
obesity?
1) Redesigning school cafeterias so that

2) Educating parents about the problem of

healthy, low-calorie options are in the most

childhood obesity and how to combat it.

visible locations.
Which of these policies do you think would be more effective in increasing voter
registration?
1) Automatic voter registration, so that

2) A public education campaign to

when people receive their driver’s licenses,

convince people to register to vote.

and show they are domiciled in your state,
they are automatically registered as voters.
Which of these policies do you think would be more effective as a means of discouraging
abortions? (Please indicate which you prefer even if you do not like either.)
1) Requiring pregnant women, before

2) Requiring pregnant women, before

having an abortion, to see vivid photos of

having an abortion, to speak briefly with a

fetuses, designed to show that they are

doctor about whether they really believe,

merely very young children.

on reflection, that an abortion is the right
choice, in light of the moral issues
involved.

Here are the results:
Table 16: Beliefs About Whether a System 1 or System 2 Nudge Is
More Effective in the Context of Each of the Six Issues
Percentage of Respondents Who Believe:
Issue

System 1 Nudge Is More Effective

System 2 Nudge Is More Effective

Smoking

71%

29%

Savings

53%

47%

Energy

45%

55%

Water

53%

47%

Obesity

57%

43%

Voting

75%

25%

Abortion

30%

70%

The most important finding is that majorities believe that the
System 1 nudge is the more effective nudge for five of the seven
questions—even though majorities prefer the System 1 nudge for only
two (see Tables 1, 9, 10, and 11). We can plausibly infer that majorities
will often prefer System 2 nudges even when they believe that System
1 nudges are more effective—strongly suggesting that personal agency
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drives some people in the direction of System 2 nudges. People’s beliefs
about effectiveness also appear to be influenced by their values. The
abortion problem is the clearest on that count; the overwhelming
majority (70 percent) say that the System 2 nudge would be more
effective even though that conclusion is far from self-evident. We might
question whether in giving this response, they are really saying what
they think is more “effective” in discouraging abortion. It is far more
likely that they are registering what they prefer, given their values.
To be sure, the population that answered the effectiveness
question was not nationally representative, and we do not know
whether an effectiveness–preference split would be observed in a
nationally representative survey, with either a within-subjects or a
between-subjects design. Nonetheless, we have seen that in the neutral
condition and the “significantly more effective condition,” the results
on the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey reported here are very much
in line with the results in the nationally representative sample. The
effectiveness answers strongly suggest that a certain percentage of
people will favor System 2 nudges even though they believe them to be
less effective.
C. Comparing the Assumptions that the System 1 Nudge Is
“Significantly More Effective” or “Dramatically More Effective”
In the main survey, the difference between Condition 1 on the one
hand and Conditions 2 and 3 on the other was large, but not massive.
For this reason, it is worth asking whether more people would prefer
the System 1 nudge if the numbers showing its greater effectiveness
were more dramatic. To test that question, I used the four standard
questions in a within-subjects design, but offered exceptionally vivid
accounts of the differential effectiveness:
• Antismoking Campaign: “Assume that 1) would be significantly
more effective than 2), in the sense that it would prevent 15,000
premature deaths each year, whereas 2) would prevent only 500.
Which of the two would you prefer, with that assumption?”
• Encouraging Retirement Savings: “Assume that 1) would be
significantly more effective than 2), in the sense that it would
mean that 90 percent of employees would be enrolled in savings
plans, whereas 2) would mean that only 30 percent would be
enrolled. Which of the two would you prefer, with that
assumption?”
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• Reducing Pollution: “Assume that 1) would be significantly
more effective than 2), in the sense that it would cut air pollution
by 50 percent (and prevent at least 2,000 annual deaths),
whereas 2) would cut air pollution by just 5 percent (and prevent
at least 200 annual deaths). Which of the two would you prefer,
with that assumption?”
• Encouraging Water Conservation: “Assume that 1) would be
significantly more effective than 2), in the sense that it would cut
water usage at hotels by 10 percent, whereas 2) would cut such
usage by just 1 percent. Which of the two would you prefer, with
that assumption?”
With these formulations, the increase in preference for the System
1 nudge from Condition 1 to Condition 3 was indeed large:
Table 17: Preference as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge
When the System 1 Nudge Is Dramatically More Effective

Issue

Percentage of Respondents Who Prefer the System 1 Nudge
Given Quantitative Information
Showing that System 1 Nudge Is
Neutral Condition
Dramatically More Effective

Smoking

42%

76%

Savings

42%

67%

Energy

35%

70%

Water

42%

64%

There are two lessons, and both of them are surprising. The first
is that the dramatic numbers in this survey produced movements (from
a low of 22 percent to a high of 34 percent) that were not higher than
those produced by less dramatic numbers (see Table 15). Apparently
many people make a judgment about something relatively crude
(“whether a big difference matters”) and they decide to move, or not
to move, accordingly. We might speculate that the difference between
significantly greater effectiveness and dramatically greater
effectiveness would be larger in a within-subjects design.
The second lesson is that, even with relatively stunning differences
in effectiveness, a substantial number of people continued to prefer the
System 2 nudge. This was the case for 24 percent of respondents who
rejected the graphic cigarette warnings at the expense of 14,500 lives,
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and for the 30 percent of respondents who rejected the automatic
enrollment in green energy programs at the expense of 1,800 lives.
What if the System 2 nudge were shown to be significantly more
effective, not in the abstract, but with the benefit of numbers? To
answer that question, I did a version of the immediately preceding
survey with the identical numbers, except for one difference: System 2
was said to be the more effective one. The results, with four hundred
participants, looked like this:
Table 18: Preference as Between the System 1 and System 2 Nudge
When the System 2 Nudge Is Dramatically More Effective
Percentage of Respondents Who Prefer the System 1 Nudge
Told System 2 Nudge Is
Issue

Neutral Condition

Dramatically More Effective

Smoking

41%

19%

Savings

44%

19%

Energy

34%

14%

Water

45%

17%

As should be expected, the assumption of quantitative data
showing dramatically greater effectiveness of System 2 nudges had a
substantial effect in this within-subjects survey. The shifts ranged from
20 percent to 28 percent. This was a large shift, and the increase in those
preferring System 2 across the four categories was nearly lock-step. At
the same time, a significant fraction of people (somewhat less than onefifth) continued to favor the System 1 nudge. It remains unclear why
they did so. Perhaps they refused to accept the effectiveness numbers.
Perhaps they believed that System 1 nudges have independent
advantages.
D. Testing Preferences with an “Either or Both” Option
The topic here has been a required choice among two options:
System 1 nudge or System 2 nudge? In many cases, however, it is
possible to choose neither, or both. Earlier work has tested the
“neither” question, and found that strong majorities of Americans and
Europeans reject that approach; they like the relevant nudges.74
Earlier work has also found that if asked to approve or disapprove
74. See Sunstein, supra note 62, at 7; Lucia A. Reisch & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Europeans
Like Nudges?, 11 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 310, 311 (2016).

SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

9/21/2016 3:18 PM

160

[Vol. 66:121

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

System 1 nudges of the kind that have been tested here, strong
majorities approve. But what if people were asked to choose System
1, System 2, or both?
Again using Amazon Mechanical Turk, I asked about four
hundred people that question. Here are the results:
Table 19: Either or Both?
Percentage of Respondents Who Preferred:
Issue

System 1 Nudge

System 2 Nudge

Both

Smoking

10%

44%

46%

Savings

16%

40%

44%

Energy

10%

56%

34%

The most obvious lesson is that numerous people will support
both, even though they will favor one or the other when they are
forced to choose between them. For both smoking and savings, “both”
did not fall that far short of obtaining majority support, and for air
pollution, it attracted over one-third of respondents. At the same time,
many people favored a System 2 nudge over “both,” probably on the
theory that the System 1 nudge is insufficiently respectful of individual
agency, or that it adds nothing to the System 2 nudge. This is a
noteworthy result; other works suggest that if people are asked
whether they support a System 1 or System 2 nudge in isolation
(smoking, savings, air pollution), they might well say yes. 75
Further study would be quite valuable in order to illuminate these
results. We might speculate that the likelihood that people will prefer
“both” depends in part on their perception of the magnitude of the
problem. If it is very serious, people might think: the more tools, the
better. The question is whether the interest in individual agency, as it
is perceived by those who favor System 2 nudges, outweighs that
thought.
V. POPULAR OPINION, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY
Survey evidence can tell us a great deal about what kinds of
policies will produce public approval or disapproval. We know that
both Americans and Europeans are broadly supportive of the kinds of
nudges that have been implemented or under serious discussion in

75. See Reisch & Sunstein, supra note 74, at 319; Sunstein, supra note 62 (manuscript at 9).
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recent years, and that this support generally cuts across partisan lines.76
We know too that when people are not asked to choose between
System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges, and are simply asked whether
they approve of a nudge, they tend to say yes. This includes, for
example, graphic warnings designed to reduce smoking and distracted
driving, and automatic enrollment in savings plans and green energy.77
We also know that Americans reject nudges that reflect what they see
as illicit ends (such as religious favoritism) or those that are
inconsistent with the values and interests of most choosers (such as
automatic contributions to particular charities).78 There is a concern
about manipulation, at least in extreme cases, such as the use of
subliminal advertising to discourage smoking79 or visual illusions to
encourage drivers to slow down.80
At the same time, the results of surveys may or may not track what
would emerge from a sustained analysis of the normative questions,
especially if the analysis is infused with an understanding of likely
consequences.81 In fact, we do not know exactly what people are
thinking when they respond to survey questions.
Consider an admittedly speculative hypothesis: System 1 prefers
System 2 nudges. That is, people might well have a rapid, intuitive
judgment that System 2 nudges are best. On this view, the automatic
system favors System 2 nudges, and the deliberative system is necessary
to override that form of favoritism. The reason might be that System 2
nudges seem the most respectful of individual agency. People might
automatically think that it is best not to use a default rule or to frighten
people, but instead to inform them, so that they can choose for
themselves. But System 2 might be more consequentialist, and so it
might not accept that automatic conclusion; it might ask about the
actual effects of one or another nudge, and not place such an overriding
emphasis on individual agency.82
76. Jung & Mellers, supra note 33, at 68.
77. On the United States, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 121–22. For European evidence,
with broadly similar results, see generally Reisch & Sunstein, supra note 74.
78. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 129–34.
79. Id. at 132.
80. See Jung & Mellers, supra note 33, at 66.
81. For a sustained argument in favor of “boosts,” see generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig,
supra note 24. Boosts can be seen as a subset of System 2 nudges. Riccardo Rebonato identifies
nudges with System 1 and objects to them on both welfarist and nonwelfarist grounds.
REBONATO, supra note 27, at 6.
82. Cf. Joshua D. Greene, Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science
Matters for Ethics, 124 ETHICS 695, 700–01 (2014) (outlining evidence of automatic, System 1
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The data here are not sufficient to support the hypothesis that
System 1 favors System 2 nudges (although I believe that it is true, at
least for many respondents); the majority’s preference for System 2
nudges may in fact be deliberative, rather than automatic. But the
hypothesis that people make an automatic judgment in favor of System
2 nudges cannot be ruled out of bounds. It could easily be tested—for
example, by asking people to answer survey questions under time
pressure or after some kind of “cognitive load” (for example, a difficult
math question, which would deplete analytical resources). It would be
worthwhile to engage in such tests, to see whether many or most people
do in fact show an immediate preference for System 2 nudges (as I
suspect).
Consider another hypothesis: System 2 favors System 1 nudges.
The basic idea is that System 2 will make all-things-considered
judgments, with careful reference to consequences. Once reflection
and deliberation are involved, people will often understand that
System 1 nudges are both more effective and less costly, even if they
lack intuitive appeal.83 The data here are also insufficient to support
that hypothesis, though it is imaginable that a careful analysis of
various situations would suggest that System 1 nudges often or
generally work better.84 And as stated, the hypothesis is far too broad:
in some circumstances, System 2 nudges will be better on normative
grounds, and System 2 will acknowledge that fact.85
How should regulators think about the choice between the two
kinds of nudges, having as they do a toolbox of instruments? It is
possible, of course, that mandates will be better than nudges of any
kind; perhaps they will be more effective and have higher net benefits.86
preference for deontological approaches, while contending that System 2 favors utilitarian
approaches).
83. See Willis, supra note 37, at 431–32 (questioning the usefulness of financial education and
arguing that helpful default rules are often better). Of course it is true that education can be
helpful, and so System 2 might decide in its favor. See Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24,
at 5 (arguing for boosting people’s capacities).
84. See Bubb, supra note 29, at 1027–28 (arguing that System 1 nudges might well work better
than System 2 nudges); Willis, supra note 37, at 431–32 (raising doubts about financial education
and arguing for sensible default rules).
85. See generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24 (arguing for what they call boosts
as opposed to what they call nudges).
86. For a provocative discussion, see generally SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY
(2014) (arguing for coercive paternalism and rejecting autonomy-based objections). In the same
vein, see Ryan Bubb & Richard Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127
HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1599 (2014) (defending mandates rather than nudges, with reference to
behavioral findings).
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It is also possible that inaction is best, because any new intervention
could have costs in excess of benefits.87 Economic incentives might be
the best approach of all.88 But in many contexts, policymakers must
specifically decide between System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges.89 To
promote savings, they might engage in an educational campaign or opt
for automatic enrollment;90 to promote access to public programs, they
might rely on education or new default rules; to discourage smoking or
distracted driving, they might rely on graphic warnings or a statistical
presentation of some kind. How should policymakers decide?
To come to terms with that question, it would be helpful to specify
the foundations for the answer. Suppose that we are welfarists,
believing that any evaluation has to turn on the effects of an
intervention on social welfare.91 If so, helpful questions are: What are
the costs and benefits of a System 1 or System 2 nudge?92 Which has
higher net benefits? For these questions, information about
effectiveness is relevant, but it is hardly sufficient on its own. We need
cost information as well. A maximally effective nudge might be too
costly to be worthwhile, or it might have lower net benefits than a
somewhat less effective but far less costly nudge.
In addition, the effectiveness information does not, by itself, give
a full account of the benefits of a nudge. If 90 percent of people end up
in savings plans, or if automatic enrollment in green energy cuts
pollution by 20 percent, what exactly are the welfare consequences?
Increases in participation rates and reductions in pollution seem
desirable, but a great deal of further work would be necessary to
understand exactly how desirable they are. Are increases in
participation rates important? How important? What are the mortality
and morbidity consequences of cutting pollution levels by 20 percent?
In these respects, the survey questions, even in the various conditions,
87. See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 143–44, 148
(2006).
88. For a crisp discussion of the circumstances in which this is so, see STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 48–49 (1981).
89. The First Amendment might turn out to be relevant insofar as government is compelling
private speech. See Jolls, supra note 28, at 54.
90. See Willis, supra note 37, at 431.
91. A welfarist approach is used in Bubb & Pildes, supra note 86, at 1599, 1601 (suggesting
that on welfare grounds, mandates are often preferable to nudges).
92. There might of course be a disjunction between welfare effects and what emerges from
a cost-benefit analysis. I am bracketing that possibility here. For a discussion of the philosophical
foundations of cost-benefit analysis, see generally MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR
DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012).
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failed to provide respondents with full information. But it is
noteworthy that as we have seen, even dramatically greater
effectiveness from System 1 nudges failed to move a large group of
people in its favor.
At first glance, welfarists would have no systematic reason to
prefer System 1 nudges to System 2 nudges, or vice versa. Everything
turns on the costs and benefits.93 But second-order considerations
might cut in one direction or another. Part of the welfare calculation
involves the cost of nudging itself. Under imaginable conditions,
System 1 nudges can be far simpler to implement (as, for example,
when they involve a mere default rule).94 At the same time, it is
relevant to ask about the long-term effects of a nudge.95 If a System 2
nudge would educate people and have beneficial effects in multiple
domains of their lives, then it would have ancillary benefits, and these
might turn out to be significant.96 (Consider financial education, which
could benefit people when they are making many economic decisions,
and which could, in principle, teach people statistical literacy as well.97)
It is doubtful that survey responses, offered without extended
contemplation, are adequately capturing these points, though some
respondents might be attentive to them.
Suppose that we are not welfarists and that we believe that for
reasons that involve dignity or autonomy, people ought to be active
agents, affirmatively responsible for outcomes that affect their lives.98
To be sure, this idea has considerable ambiguity, but something of this
sort undergirds the judgment that even if automatic enrollment of
some kind can promote people’s welfare, it is more respectful to them,
and therefore best, for them to become informed and then to choose.99
93. If a System 1 nudge causes a welfare loss because people resent it, that loss would of
course have to be included. Cf. CONLY, supra note 86, at 155–59 (cataloguing the welfare effects
of soda regulation).
94. See Willis, supra note 37, at 432 (using a welfarist framework to challenge financial
literacy training).
95. For relevant discussion, see Hunt Alcott & Todd Rogers, The Short-Run and Long-Run
Effects of Behavioral Interventions 18–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
18492, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18492 [https://perma.cc/9AAZ-6ZNB] (showing that
information about social norms has only short-term effects unless the information is provided for
a significant period of time, in which case it can have significant long-term effects).
96. See generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24 (defending “boosts”).
97. See GERD GIGERENZER, RISK SAVVY: HOW TO MAKE GOOD DECISIONS 246 (2015)
(arguing for risk-related education).
98. See generally REBONATO, supra note 27 (arguing broadly on behalf of active choosing).
99. Cf. Nicolas Cornell, A Third Theory of Paternalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1295, 1308 n.43,
1336 (2015) (arguing that paternalism shows such disrespect).
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Perhaps what is wrong with paternalism, even of the choice-preserving
kind, is that it is insulting to people’s capacity for agency; perhaps it
shows a form of disrespect.100 Why not educate people, rather than
enrolling them in a program that the government thinks is in their
interest?
Different people who press this question might accept diverse
kinds of answers. Some people might agree that if automatic
enrollment is significantly better on welfare grounds,101 it is not
necessary or preferable to educate people; but they would insist that
the government must meet the burden of demonstrating that it is
significantly better. Other people might adopt a strong presumption in
favor of educative approaches and demand an exceptionally strong
demonstration of higher net benefits. Still others might believe that, in
at least some contexts, no such demonstration could justify a System 1
nudge. A continuum of beliefs might well be imagined. Such a
continuum would, of course, fit with the results here.
CONCLUSION
In some circles, there is a strong preference for interventions that
augment people’s capacities,102 and skepticism about forms of choice
architecture that seem to exploit or take advantage of people’s
fallibility.103 If a default rule works because of inertia, for example, it
might be seen to be a form of manipulation,104 and even if that charge
is far too strong,105 some people might contend that it is best to rely on
education.106 On one view, the choice between System 1 and System 2
100. Id. A powerful response arguing that it is not disrespectful for government to act on the
basis of an accurate understanding of people’s capacities can be found in CONLY, supra note 86,
at 36, 45.
101. Willis, supra note 37, at 431–32 (urging that automatic enrollment is desirable and
preferable to financial education).
102. See REBONATO, supra note 27, at 105 (arguing against nudges).
103. See generally Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24 (arguing for boosts rather than
nudges). For relevant discussion from another direction, see generally CONLY, supra note 86
(defending coercive paternalism); Moles, supra note 34, at 2–4 (defending nudges against various
objections).
104. On that topic, see Anne Barnhill, What Is Manipulation?, in MANIPULATION: THEORY
& PRACTICE 50, 71–72 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2014) (defining manipulation by
reference to ideals for beliefs and emotions). Barnhill builds on Robert Noggle, Manipulative
Actions: A Conceptual and Moral Analysis, 33 AM. PHIL. Q. 43, 46 (1996) (offering a similar
definition).
105. For an argument that characterizing a default rule that works because of inertia (as
manipulation) is far too strong, see generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 33.
106. See Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 24, at 19.
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nudges depends on an assessment of comparative welfare effects,
which requires a form of cost-benefit analysis. On another view,
concerns about autonomy and dignity deserve a central place.107
My primary goal in this Article has been to investigate what
people actually think about these questions. The central finding is that
most people usually do prefer System 2 nudges, at least in the class of
cases that were tested. Moreover, this preference cuts across partisan
lines. When participants were told to assume that System 1 nudges
were significantly more effective, they were more likely to prefer
System 1 nudges—usually producing a shift toward such nudges of
between 10 percent and 14 percent.108 When participants were given
quantitative information showing that System 1 was significantly more
effective, the shift was essentially identical (at least in a betweensubjects design).109 And when people were asked to assume that System
2 nudges were significantly more effective, their judgments were about
the same as in the neutral condition—a most unexpected finding.110
Differences across partisan affiliations were not pervasive, but
they did emerge in several contexts. For example, Democrats are more
inclined to favor System 1 nudges in the contexts of green energy and
water conservation.111 But the more dramatic finding is that in general,
Democrats, Republicans, and independents show strikingly similar
patterns of responses. They tend to favor System 2 nudges, at least in
the standard cases, to shift by the same percentages both when they are
asked to assume that the System 1 nudge is significantly more effective
and when they are given quantitative information to demonstrate that
it is more effective, and to show the same results in the neutral
condition and when they are asked to assume that the System 2 nudge
is significantly more effective.112
Follow-up studies show that in a within-subjects design, some of
these findings are reversed.113 With that design, quantitative
information that specifies the greater effectiveness of System 1 nudges
does make a difference. With that design, a statement that System 2
nudges are “significantly more effective” increases support for System

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Waldron, supra note 35 (emphasizing the importance of dignity).
See supra Table 2.
See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 5.
See supra Tables 6, 7, 8.
See supra Table 15.
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2 nudges. A majority of respondents believes that System 1 nudges are
likely to be more effective even when a majority prefers System 2
nudges—a strong clue that some people like those nudges for reasons
that have nothing to do with effectiveness. Offered the opportunity to
choose both System 1 and System 2 nudges, a large number of people
do exactly that.
It is important to emphasize how much remains to be learned. As
we have seen, different subject areas elicit different responses. If
people care greatly about the end, perhaps effectiveness is all that
matters,114 and the issue of agency will seem beside the point. For
example, a System 1 nudge to reduce criminal violence might be
preferred purely on effectiveness grounds, and people will not much
care that a System 2 nudge preserves people’s capacity to exercise their
own agency (to murder or to rape). We can easily go further: if people
are outraged by the conduct that is being targeted (murder, rape), and
if they want to eliminate it, a mandate will be entirely acceptable, and
a System 1 nudge, complementing that mandate, will be
unobjectionable in principle.
To the extent that the issue is polarizing on political grounds, we
might also expect to see polarized judgments about which kind of
nudge to favor. The abortion example is exemplary on this ground. We
have seen that while most Democrats and Republicans favor System 2
nudges to reduce abortions, the percentage of Republicans who favor
System 1 nudges is significantly higher. For pollution reduction and
water conservation, there is a similar difference, but in the opposite
direction. If people question or do not like the ends of those who
deploy nudges, they might end up preferring System 2 nudges, because
they seem better on autonomy grounds. It should therefore be
unsurprising that in some conditions, we also find partisan differences
with respect to increasing voter registration and combatting childhood
obesity.
These findings have large implications for judgments about
nudging in general. They suggest that we will find comparative
receptivity to System 1 nudges when the ends seem desirable and when
people trust the officials who seek to secure them—and comparative

114. A focus on net benefits would of course be better than a focus on effectiveness, because
welfare is what matters, and net benefits are a measure of welfare. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges
That Fail 20 (July 18, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2809658 [https://perma.cc/CN97-CUUS] (“What matters is welfare, not
effectiveness.”).

SUNSTEIN IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

9/21/2016 3:18 PM

168

[Vol. 66:121

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

skepticism about System 1 nudges when the ends seem questionable or
the officials untrustworthy.115
The most interesting question involves the precise tradeoff
between sacrificing a degree of personal agency (as System 1 nudges
might be taken to do) and increasing effectiveness. People put different
weight on agency, and understand it in different ways,116 and some will
demand a steep price, in terms of effectiveness, to compromise it. Here
as well, context matters, and so the value placed on agency will be high
for some populations (with respect to, say, the right to choose
abortion), whereas it will be low for those very populations (with
respect to, say, voter registration). The value of agency varies across
persons and contexts.
Although some people greatly like to exercise agency, and want
to retain it,117 other people do not; they choose not to choose.118 On this
count, context matters greatly. For some of the subjects of nudging, the
exercise of agency is a cost rather than a benefit; voter registration is
the most prominent case in point. A form of choice architecture that
simply respects rights, and does not require people to take action to
enjoy them, might be strongly favored on the ground that it makes
things easy.119 The example suggests a larger point. System 1 might tend
to prefer System 2 nudges, and System 2 might agree, but after
sustained analysis, System 2 will often conclude that System 1 nudges
are best.

115. Consider in this light the finding that as compared to people in other European nations,
Hungarians are unusually skeptical about nudges. See Reisch & Sunstein, supra note 74, at 14.
116. Note that both System 1 and System 2 nudges retain freedom of choice and so might be
seen to respect agency. For a discussion, see Moles, supra note 34, at 17 (discussing autonomy and
nudging).
117. For relevant evidence, see Bobadilla-Suarez et al., supra note 44, at 8, 10–12 (finding that
people will pay a premium to retain control, even when they know that delegation would be in
their economic interest).
118. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 54 (discussing why the choice not to choose can be
rational, and offering many examples of the phenomenon).
119. See THALER, supra note 3, at 237–38.

